Since 2011, Curaçao has been searching for an answer to the future of the Isla refinery. There have been Memorandums of Understanding, international negotiations, new candidates, preferred bidders and legal proceedings, each time accompanied by renewed hope that a new operator could breathe life back into the refinery.
The timeline shows a clear pattern: PDVSA, GZE, Motiva/Aramco, Klesch, CORC, CPR, Global Oil and ORYX/Vigor. One process after another began with expectations but ended without a lasting restart of refining operations.
Today, however, there is a statement that places this history in a new perspective.
2BAYS director Patrick Newton recently stated that “a refinery will not return” to the Isla site. According to the direction presented by 2BAYS, the future of the area lies in other industrial activities, including asphalt and graphite production, oil storage and maritime activities.
That statement is significant. If, after 15 years of searching for an operator, negotiating, selecting partners and attempting to restart petroleum activities, the state-owned company managing the site now says that refining will not return, then it is also time to close the financial books on that period.
This raises a question that is more important than simply determining who was responsible for each failed process:
How much did all of this really cost Curaçao?
We are not talking only about negotiation expenses. Each process involved employees, advisers, attorneys, directors, organizations and experts. Refineria di Kòrsou (RdK), now 2BAYS, had to be financed, and we should not forget Curaçao Refinery Utilities (CRU).
During the years that the refinery was inactive, installations still had to be maintained, secured and managed. There were due diligence investigations, international travel, legal proceedings and repeated efforts to identify and select another operator.
Those expenses have never been presented to the public in one comprehensive overview showing how much the entire process ultimately cost.
That is remarkable. When the government invests millions in roads, schools or hospitals, we rightly want to know what that investment produced. Why should we not ask the same question about one of the largest economic dossiers in Curaçao’s history?
There is another issue that deserves attention. The timeline indicates that RdK’s, now 2BAYS’, claim against PDVSA of approximately US$1.1 billion was ultimately reduced to around US$450 million. That is a difference of roughly US$650 million.
This does not automatically mean that Curaçao lost US$650 million. Reaching such a conclusion would require a proper legal and financial analysis of the settlement. But the amount involved is significant enough to justify full transparency.
For that reason, I believe an independent financial reconstruction of the entire 2011–2026 period is necessary. The objective should not be to assign political blame, but to ensure good governance and accountability.
For each year, the public should be able to see how much public money went to RdK/2BAYS, CRU, consultants, legal assistance, maintenance, security, negotiations and operator-selection procedures. Any guarantees, loans, accounting losses and financial concessions should also be presented separately.
Only then can we arrive at two important figures: how much Curaçao actually spent and how much financial value may ultimately have been lost.
Only with those figures can we seriously evaluate what 15 years of refinery management actually produced.
Newton’s recent statement makes such an evaluation even more urgent. In 2023, Newton himself indicated that he strongly believed in the refinery’s future and that refining could remain relevant for another 20 to 30 years. Three years later, the message is that the refinery will not return.
Such a major change in direction should have a clear economic, technical and financial basis. And if that basis exists, the people of Curaçao have the right to know what it is.
This should not become another political battle over the past. But if Curaçao wants to move forward, it must understand what the past has cost.
A new phase is beginning. 2BAYS is talking about asphalt, graphite, storage, maritime activities and other forms of industry. These may certainly represent genuine economic opportunities. But after 15 years of processes that did not produce the expected result, presenting another list of potential projects is no longer enough.
What is needed is an integrated plan with clear objectives, investment requirements, risks, sources of financing, employment projections and measurable economic results.
Otherwise, Curaçao risks beginning another round of new plans, hiring new consultants and spending millions more without first clearly defining what results it intends to achieve.
Newton’s statement should therefore mark the moment when Curaçao closes one chapter and opens another.
But before opening the next chapter, the people have the right to know what the previous one cost:
How much did 15 years of searching for a future for the refinery cost the people of Curaçao, and what did Curaçao receive in return?
That figure does not belong only to the government or to 2BAYS.
It belongs to the people of Curaçao.
Orlando Meulens
Columnist