CARACAS – The loyalty of Venezuela’s armed forces under Nicolás Maduro was maintained not only through promotions, senior government positions and personal privileges, but also by turning the military into a major economic actor with extensive interests of its own, according to research by the Miranda Center for Democracy.
The study identifies 44 entities operating under Venezuela’s Ministry of Defense, including 24 companies and 20 foundations or autonomous services. It also found that at least 103 military officers have served on the boards of state-owned companies.
The military’s economic involvement extends far beyond weapons production or supplying the armed forces. According to the research, military-linked entities participate in banking, insurance, oil and gas, mining, agriculture, transportation, manufacturing, vehicle assembly, tourism and other commercial activities.
Among the entities highlighted are Banco de la Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana, the military-owned bank commonly known as BANFANB; CAMIMPEG, which operates in sectors including oil, gas and mining; and the Complejo Industrial Tiuna.
The report argues that this economic structure has significant political consequences.
When the survival of a government also guarantees military leaders continued access to companies, contracts, financial resources and influential economic positions, breaking with the political leadership potentially carries a much greater cost than simply losing a military appointment.
According to the Miranda Center, this creates an environment in which the interests of parts of the military establishment become increasingly intertwined with those of the government.
The findings are consistent with earlier investigations into the economic role of Venezuela’s military.
The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project previously reported that nearly one-third of 312 active Venezuelan Army generals it identified in 2019 had connections to companies authorized to conduct business with the state. Thirty-five generals were directly associated with private companies that had collectively obtained more than 220 government contracts.
Other organizations, including Transparencia Venezuela, have also documented extensive participation by active and retired military officers in state-owned companies operating in strategically important sectors of the Venezuelan economy.
The Miranda Center describes the system as a form of “military-commercial capture.” Under this interpretation, the issue goes beyond military officers simply managing several government companies. Instead, political authority, military power and economic benefits become mutually dependent.
The study argues that this architecture allows economic control to function as an instrument for maintaining the loyalty of the armed forces, which have remained one of the most important pillars of Venezuela’s political system.
The conclusion, however, is the interpretation presented by the Miranda Center’s researchers and not an acknowledgment by the Venezuelan government. The government has historically defended military participation in economic activities as part of the armed forces’ contribution to national development.
The broader evidence nevertheless shows that Venezuela’s military has developed a substantial presence across important areas of the economy.
That helps explain why discussions about political change in Venezuela have repeatedly focused on the armed forces. For senior officers with economic interests tied to the existing system, a change in political power could potentially affect not only their military careers, but also access to a much wider network of businesses, resources and economic influence.