WILLEMSTAD – A new legal policy analysis has concluded that the only structurally sound solution to the ongoing debate over the role of SOAB is a clear separation between its control and execution functions. According to the analysis, partial fixes such as amending SOAB’s statutes or expanding its mandate by law may reduce short-term pressure, but will not prevent future criticism from the General Audit Chamber or recurring questions about legality and independence.
The discussion centers on the role of SOAB, which was formally established as a control and audit institution, but has in practice also carried out executive and project-related tasks for ministries. Because these tasks are not clearly anchored in law or in SOAB’s statutory mandate, the situation has led to ongoing concerns about authority, separation of powers, and the legality of public spending.
The analysis evaluates three possible solutions available to the government. The first option, a change to SOAB’s statutes to explicitly allow executive tasks, is described as legally weak. While such a change could be implemented quickly and with limited political resistance, it would not override existing legal frameworks that position SOAB primarily as a control body. As a result, the risk of continued criticism from the Audit Chamber would remain high.
A second option, expanding SOAB’s mandate through legislation, would provide a clearer legal basis for its activities. However, the analysis warns that combining control and execution within a single organization remains fundamentally problematic. International auditing standards emphasize strict separation between those who execute policy and those who audit it. Even with a legal mandate, the risk of undermining SOAB’s independence would persist, leaving room for future criticism.
The third option, and the one identified as legally safest and most durable, is a structural separation of functions. Under this model, SOAB would return fully to its role as an independent control and audit institution, while executive and project-based tasks would be transferred back to ministries or to a separate implementation body. This approach aligns with public finance principles, international audit norms, and established standards used by audit institutions worldwide. It would significantly reduce the likelihood of future findings of irregularity by the Audit Chamber.
The analysis stresses that while such a separation requires time and careful transition planning, it offers the clearest governance structure and strengthens accountability. It also minimizes the risk of recurring debates over authority and legality, which have increasingly burdened both the government and oversight institutions.
Importantly, the analysis also addresses a sensitive follow-up question: whether restructuring SOAB would retroactively legitimize work already carried out without a clear legal basis. The answer is unequivocal. Adjustments to structure or legislation do not automatically make past actions lawful. In public financial management, legality is assessed at the moment a decision or expenditure is made. Later changes cannot erase earlier shortcomings, nor can they undo audit findings already issued.
In practice, this means that earlier SOAB activities may continue to be classified as irregular from a legal standpoint, even if no sanctions follow. Typically, such cases remain within the realm of political accountability and administrative correction, rather than legal enforcement. Governments, the analysis notes, usually “repair the future, not the past,” by adjusting structures to prevent repetition.
The author of the analysis, former Audit Chamber auditor and PAR faction staff member drs. Luigi A. Faneyte, concludes that the government’s strategic focus should be on preventing further structural risks. By clearly separating execution from oversight, Curaçao can restore legal clarity, protect the independence of its audit institutions, and bring an end to a debate that has repeatedly resurfaced in audit reports and parliamentary discussions.
The findings add weight to growing calls for a fundamental rethinking of SOAB’s role, rather than incremental adjustments that leave the core governance problem unresolved.