For decades, when Curaçao discussed economic opportunities in Venezuela, the conversation almost automatically turned to oil. The refinery, Bullenbaai, storage tanks, shipping and the possibility of restarting petroleum activities dominated the debate.
That may now be too narrow a way of looking at the opportunity.
A significant change announced by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on August 27 suggests that Washington is creating more room for U.S. companies to invest and operate in Venezuela. For Curaçao, only a short distance from the Venezuelan coast, the question should therefore be broader: if billions of dollars in investment eventually return to Venezuela, how much of the business surrounding those investments can be handled from Curaçao?
The answer could involve considerably more than storing Venezuelan oil.
Washington is changing the rules
The latest OFAC changes are technical, but the reason Washington gives for making them is economically significant.
As of August 27, parties entering contracts authorized under several Venezuela General Licenses are no longer required to stipulate that those contracts be interpreted under U.S. law.
OFAC explicitly says it made the changes in response to “investment-related reforms” undertaken by the Venezuelan government since January 2026. More importantly, the U.S. government says it continues to support efforts by American businesses to reinvest in Venezuela.
That is a significant signal.
It does not mean that U.S. sanctions against Venezuela have disappeared. They have not. Nor does it mean Venezuela has suddenly become a conventional, low-risk investment destination.
But Washington is clearly creating a framework under which certain economic activities can resume.
For Curaçao, that deserves attention.
There is an important limitation
Curaçao cannot simply position Willemstad as the arbitration center for every new contract between an American investor and the Venezuelan government or PdVSA.
OFAC continues to require contracts covered by several of these General Licenses to provide that dispute-resolution proceedings take place in the United States, United Kingdom, France or Singapore.
Curaçao is not on that list.
At first sight, that might appear to close the door on Curaçao.
It doesn't.
OFAC makes an important distinction between the principal contract involving Venezuela and the secondary commercial relationships surrounding that transaction.
Its guidance specifically states that the dispute-resolution restriction does not apply to indirect parties or counterparties providing services connected to an authorized transaction.
OFAC itself gives shipping and insurance as examples.
For instance, if an American company purchases Venezuelan-origin oil from PdVSA, the contract between that company and PdVSA would be subject to the prescribed dispute-resolution locations. But a separate contract between that company and an insurer would not automatically be subject to the same restriction.
That distinction potentially creates an opening for Curaçao.
Every investment creates an ecosystem
Suppose international companies begin investing billions in Venezuelan oil fields, mining, infrastructure, electricity, telecommunications or other sectors.
Those companies do not operate in isolation.
They need lawyers.
They need accountants.
They need banks and payment services.
They need corporate structures.
They need compliance specialists.
They need sanctions advice.
They need auditors.
They need insurers.
They need shipping companies.
They need due diligence.
They need logistics.
And eventually, some will have commercial disputes.
This is where Curaçao should be asking a different economic question.
Instead of asking only, “How many barrels can we store at Bullenbaai?”, policymakers should also ask:
How much of the professional infrastructure surrounding Venezuelan investment can be located in Willemstad?
Curaçao already has part of the infrastructure
Curaçao would not be starting from zero.
The island has lawyers accustomed to cross-border transactions, accountants, trust and corporate-service providers, financial institutions and extensive maritime expertise.
It is multilingual, geographically close to Venezuela and operates within the constitutional framework of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.
There is also an interesting, and perhaps underused, asset: international arbitration.
The Netherlands Arbitration Institute highlighted Curaçao's potential as an international arbitration center in October 2025, citing the island's judiciary, multilingual legal environment and strategic geographic location.
The NAI Arbitration Rules can already be used with Willemstad designated as the place of arbitration.
Curaçao has also adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, providing an internationally recognizable legal framework for commercial arbitration.
And arbitral awards made in Curaçao benefit from the framework of the New York Convention, facilitating recognition and enforcement internationally.
Again, that does not override OFAC's restrictions for direct contracts with Venezuela covered by the relevant licenses.
But there could be an entirely different market involving the commercial relationships that develop around those investments.
Imagine Curaçao as the regional back office
This is where the economic strategy becomes more interesting.
A company investing $500 million in Venezuela may need only limited physical activity in Curaçao.
But it could establish its regional administration here.
Contracts could be drafted here.
Compliance teams could operate here.
Accountants could work here.
Ships could be managed from here.
Insurance and corporate services could be coordinated here.
Due diligence could be conducted here.
Regional executives could live here.
Commercial disputes between indirect counterparties could potentially be arbitrated here where legally permitted.
The result would be a completely different type of economic activity from refining oil.
It is knowledge-intensive rather than land-intensive.
It creates professional employment.
And it potentially strengthens industries Curaçao already possesses rather than requiring the island to build an entirely new economic sector from scratch.
The timing is particularly interesting
This opportunity also fits with another development.
The Kingdom of the Netherlands is rebuilding diplomatic relations with Venezuela, while Dutch State Secretary Eric van der Burg has publicly raised the possibility of Curaçao and Aruba becoming economic and logistical gateways between Europe and northern South America.
The two developments should be considered together.
If the United States is facilitating certain forms of reinvestment in Venezuela and the Kingdom is simultaneously rebuilding diplomatic relations with Caracas, Curaçao suddenly finds itself geographically positioned between three economic spaces: Europe, the United States and South America.
That position has value.
But geography alone does not create an industry.
Curaçao would need a deliberate strategy
Singapore did not become an international business and arbitration center merely because ships passed nearby.
The same applies to Curaçao.
Government, the legal profession, accountants, banks, insurers, trust companies, the maritime sector, universities and other knowledge institutions would have to determine whether building a Venezuela-related professional-services cluster is realistic.
There are practical questions.
Can Curaçao's banks comfortably process permitted Venezuela-related transactions?
Do local professionals have sufficient sanctions expertise?
Can international companies easily establish regional offices here?
Are our corporate and tax structures competitive?
Do we have enough specialist lawyers and accountants?
Can Curaçao develop a deeper pool of international arbitrators?
Can companies obtain the necessary insurance?
And perhaps most importantly: can investors rely on Curaçao to provide regulatory certainty?
Those questions need answers before marketing campaigns begin.
Compliance could itself become an export product
There is another opportunity hidden inside the complexity.
Venezuela will remain a highly complicated jurisdiction for international companies.
Companies operating there will have to understand precisely what OFAC permits, which counterparties remain blocked, how payments can be structured, what reporting requirements apply and where sanctions exposure remains.
That complexity creates demand for expertise.
Curaçao could potentially develop sanctions compliance and Venezuela-related due diligence as specialized professional services.
Instead of viewing sanctions exclusively as an obstacle to doing business, Curaçao could build expertise around helping legitimate businesses operate within the rules.
That is precisely the type of high-value knowledge economy the island has discussed developing for years.
But Curaçao should move before others do
There is nothing guaranteeing that this business will come to Curaçao.
Miami already possesses enormous Venezuelan commercial expertise.
Panama has sophisticated logistics, banking and corporate services.
Bogotá has a large professional-services sector.
Madrid has deep commercial links with Latin America.
London, Paris, Singapore and major American cities already dominate international arbitration and complex commercial transactions.
Curaçao therefore cannot rely on being close to Venezuela.
It has to offer something better.
Its potential proposition could be the combination of proximity to Venezuela, familiarity with European legal traditions, multilingual professionals, maritime infrastructure, political links to the Kingdom and an internationally recognized arbitration framework.
That combination is unusual.
Whether Curaçao can turn it into a competitive advantage is another question.
Stop thinking only about restarting the past
Perhaps the most important point is that Curaçao should not see Venezuela's reopening merely as an opportunity to recreate the economic relationship that existed decades ago.
That would mean returning to the same discussion: refinery, crude oil, storage and transshipment.
Those activities may again become important, particularly at Bullenbaai.
But Venezuela's potential economic reopening could offer something larger.
Every barrel of oil has contracts behind it.
Every ship needs insurance.
Every international investor needs legal advice.
Every financing arrangement requires due diligence.
Every multinational needs accounting and compliance.
And every major commercial relationship carries the possibility of a dispute.
The barrel is therefore only the visible part of the economic chain.
For Curaçao, the real opportunity may be everything surrounding it.
If international capital is beginning to return to Venezuela, Curaçao should not simply ask how much Venezuelan oil can pass through the island.
It should ask how much Venezuelan-related international business can be managed from here.
That could ultimately be worth far more to Curaçao's economic diversification than another tank filled with crude.