There is something fundamentally inconsistent in the current debate over Curaçao’s monetary union with Sint Maarten.
Prime Minister Gilmar Pisas, reportedly supported by Minister Charles Cooper, is seriously considering withdrawing Curaçao from the monetary union. The trigger is a governance dispute over who has the authority to appoint the chairman of the Supervisory Board of the Central Bank of Curaçao and Sint Maarten.
At first glance, the argument seems straightforward. Curaçao accounts for roughly 80 percent of the economic weight within the central bank structure. Therefore, it argues, it should have greater influence. In simple terms: whoever contributes more should have more say.
But that logic raises a deeper and more uncomfortable question.
Is that really the principle Curaçao wants to defend?
Because when the conversation shifts toward the Kingdom level—particularly in relation to the Netherlands—the same political voices tend to argue the exact opposite. Then, the emphasis is on equality, autonomy, and the rejection of external interference. The idea that “who pays, decides” is often criticized as outdated, even colonial.
Yet now, when Curaçao finds itself in the stronger position relative to Sint Maarten, that same principle suddenly becomes acceptable.
That contradiction cannot be ignored.
A closer reading of the statutes governing the central bank offers little support for Curaçao’s position. The framework does not link economic weight to governance power. The 80–20 financial distribution between Curaçao and Sint Maarten was known from the outset and is only relevant in the event of a dissolution—not for day-to-day decision-making or institutional control.
The monetary union was built on the principle of equality, not proportional dominance. That is precisely what defines a union: shared responsibility, shared governance, and mutual trust.
To now attempt to redefine that structure based on economic contribution risks undermining the very foundation of the system.
And it does more than that.
It weakens Curaçao’s moral standing.
Because how can Curaçao continue to advocate for equality within the Kingdom of the Netherlands while simultaneously seeking dominance over a smaller partner? How can it argue for respect and autonomy vis-à-vis a stronger country, while applying a different standard to a weaker one?
Principles cannot be selective.
Either equality matters, or it does not.
If Curaçao believes that governance should be based on economic weight, then it must be prepared to accept that logic in all directions—not only when it is convenient. If, on the other hand, it truly believes in equality between partners, then that principle must also apply to Sint Maarten.
This is not just a technical debate about central bank governance. It is a test of political consistency.
And ultimately, of credibility.
Because in the end, the question is simple: is equality a value, or just a strategy?