WILLEMSTAD - The conviction of Michelangelo “Low” Martines, sitting Member of Parliament and former leader of Korsou Esun Miho (KEM), does far more than establish his guilt in drug trafficking and money laundering. The annexes to the court verdict reveal an extraordinary level of detail — exposing how a public official allegedly conducted political campaigning while simultaneously operating inside a sophisticated criminal organization.
The documents paint a portrait of a man living in two parallel worlds:
the public world of party leadership, parliamentary debates, and political travel;
and the underground economy of cocaine transport, cash movements, encrypted communications, and international financial exchanges.
This is the story that emerges from the investigation — a rare, inside look at the machinery of organized crime intersecting with Curaçao’s political system.
A politician in two worlds
During the years covered by the criminal investigation, Martines was both party leader of KEM and later a Member of Parliament. In his home, investigators found documents typical of a political life: party correspondence, campaign papers, travel documents.
But next to those papers lay the tools of a criminal command center: multiple smartphones containing hundreds of thousands of data points — photos of cash bundles, videos, voice notes, chat logs, and contact lists spanning Curaçao, the Netherlands, Spain, and the Dominican Republic.
Digital forensics tied these devices directly to Martines through linked accounts, email addresses, social media profiles, and voice recordings in his own voice.
Step 1 — Building contacts and trust networks
The annexes describe a tight, closed circle of trusted intermediaries:
“Michel B.” – a Curaçao-based contact and frequent correspondent
“Wisel Chino New” and “Wissel Negro” – daily communications about cash deliveries, missing amounts, exchange rates
Others identified only as “the footballer,” “brother-in-law,” “Icho”
Communication occurred through WhatsApp but also through Sky ECC, an encrypted platform long associated with large-scale international drug operations.
Step 2 — Phones as a criminal command center
The court found that Martines operated the Sky ECC account OBJG28, based on:
Messages in Papiamentu, Spanish, and Dutch
References to “M,” “Curaçao,” and KEM political activities
A voice note in which his voice was unmistakable
A video on his Samsung J6 showing an active OBJG28 chat
Inside these chats, organizers coordinated shipments of 20 kilos, 100 kilos, and “boxes” — quantities consistent with professional cocaine trafficking.
Step 3 — Command, control, and instruction
The court concluded Martines acted primarily as organizer and supervisor, not courier.
Examples from the annexes include:
Ordering the return of €1 million because “the job had not yet been done”
Responding instantly to reports of missing money — “there is €1,000 missing” — and adjusting percentages and payouts
Giving instructions to runners, intermediaries, and money handlers
He was, in the court’s words, the coordinator of financial flows and logistics.
Step 4 — Cash management: Photos as evidence
Investigators found photos of stacks of euros and dollars on his iPhone. These were taken and immediately forwarded via WhatsApp — a common accountability method in money-laundering networks.
One July 2023 message to “Michel B.” included photos of:
€35,000
$25,900
$10,000
€9,600
Along with the instruction:
“I’m putting 35 plus 23,900 in the bag. Your people will receive it.”
This matches known cash-handling procedures in laundering operations: bundle cash → photograph → send as proof → courier picks up.
Step 5 — Field operations
RST surveillance placed Martines at a gas station in August 2024, interacting with a known courier (“L.”). Although he later denied being there, security footage confirmed his presence.
This shows he was not merely a remote coordinator — at times he personally oversaw critical handovers.
Step 6 — The role of political office
The judge emphasized that Martines’ position as a Member of Parliament gave him:
legitimacy,
mobility,
and reduced suspicion.
His home contained active political documents, while his phones contained the encrypted world of drug logistics. This dual identity allowed him to operate across both realms with relative ease.
A man living a double life
The investigation reveals a politician who simultaneously:
ran a political party,
campaigned,
attended parliamentary sessions,
while also:
coordinating cocaine shipments,
managing cash transactions,
directing couriers,
using encrypted criminal networks.
The boundary between these identities disappeared entirely, according to the court.
The larger picture
Martines did not act as a courier or middleman — he functioned as a central node in a wider network of:
international cocaine routes,
euro and dollar cash flows,
trusted local intermediaries,
encrypted communication systems.
The court described his conduct as grave and undermining, precisely because he used a public office to mask, facilitate, or enable criminal operations.
This duality — elected official and criminal coordinator — is what makes the Martines case unprecedented in Curaçao’s political history.
It raises profound questions about oversight, political integrity, and the vulnerabilities of democratic institutions in small island states facing the pressures of international drug trafficking.
